Evidence from the Great Recession ya a a ko s a a n t w i j o h n r . b ow b l i s
I. Introduction
New employees can be costly, as new hires need to be trained to become familiar with the procedures and operations of a firm. Thus, excessive employee turnover can be a source of concern. In contrast, low turnover can be undesirable if retained workers are poor performers who lack the motivation or the ability to find better jobs. Turnover is potentially an important determinant of firm output in the health-care industry but has received little attention from economists. Turnover in health facilities reduces the effectiveness and productivity of delivering care and may also increase operating cost (Squillace et al. 2008) . For instance, when nurses, one of the largest labor inputs in health-care production, are assigned to the same patients, they can form personal bonds, which may lead to better health outcomes (Thomas et al. 2013) . For this reason, policy makers and trade associations have made efforts to identify and address turnover, particularly in the nursing home industry. For example, in 2012, the American Health Care Association announced a the current literature that examines quality outcomes has ignored the endogeneity of turnover that may arise because of time-varying omitted variable bias. 2 This paper examines whether employee turnover in nursing homes impacts patient quality and mortality after accounting for the endogeneity of turnover. We utilize administrative data for all nursing homes in California. We chose California because it has available information on turnover for various types of nursing home staffing, and it has a large nursing home industry, with about 8 percent of all nursing home facilities in the United States. We examine the period 2005-11, during which California's economy saw significant economic growth and contraction. We use this variation in the economy's strength over time and geographically across the state as our exclusion restriction in an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Specifically, the exclusion restriction is the unemployment rate in the nursing home's county. Identification relies on the assumption that changes in county unemployment rates affect quality of care only through turnover. As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) note, when the unemployment rate is high, the threat of firing improves the quality through lower turnover. Because many nursing home residents are paid by government programs (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) or are expected to remain in a nursing home for the rest of their lives, their personal health and hence quality of care is unlikely to be impacted by the state of the local economy once other factors are accounted for in the model. 3 Using a panel data set constructed by merging information from the Online Survey Certification and Reporting System (OSCAR), Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Area Health Resource File, we find that ignoring endogeneity leads to a systematic underestimation of the effect of nursing turnover on the quality of care and mortality. We find that a 10 percentage point increase in nursing turnover leads to an additional 1.8 deficiency citations to a nursing home per annual regulatory survey. This represents a 16.5 percent increase in deficiency citations. Not accounting for endogeneity leads to results that suggest that nurse turnover leads to a facility receiving 0.14 more deficiency citations, or a 1 percent increase in citations. For most of our other quality measures, we find that nursing turnover leads to worse quality of care, though this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels in some specifications. We also find suggestive evidence that as turnover increases, a greater percentage of discharged nursing home residents are discharged because of death.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between turnover and outcomes. First, to the best of our knowledge the existing literature on the impact of turnover on outcomes in nursing homes is noncausal. While some studies use panel 2 One paper outside of the economics literature used instrumental variables to examine how turnover impacts nurse staffing levels (Kash et al. 2006) . The paper used training expense ratio, benefits expense ratio, professional staff ratio, and contracted staff ratio as instruments. These ratios are likely to impact turnover but may also influence staffing levels, potentially undermining these ratios as valid exclusion restrictions. 3 We formally argue the validity of the exclusion restriction in the section titled "Exclusion Restriction Variable. " data with FE to account for any unobserved heterogeneity, FE cannot handle omitted time-varying factors. The changing policies and advocate efforts to improve the quality of nursing homes, along with personal hiring/firing decisions that align with nursing home quality, make turnover endogenous even with an FE model. By using FE panel IV regression, endogeneity bias from a number of factors is accounted for in our regressions. Second, this paper expands the existing literature on the business cycle and health (Ruhm 2000) . With recent work (Stevens et al. 2015) finding that mortality in nursing homes may be driving the procyclical nature of mortality, nurse turnover may be a potential factor. And finally, the nursing home industry is large, with revenues equivalent to nearly 2 percent of GDP, and much of the turnover is among lower-skilled workers. Therefore, understanding turnover in this industry may provide insight into other industries.
II. Conceptual Model of Turnover and Nursing Home Quality
Prior research outside of the health-care sector has found that high employee turnover can lead to lower productivity, diminished profits, and poor customer service (Eckardt, Skaggs, and Youndt 2014; Siebert and Zubanov 2009; Ton and Huckman 2008) . One argument for these results is that lack of room for promotion or higher wages from outside options may encourage workers with desirable traits to seek outside employment (Mas 2006; Munasinghe 2006) . When motivated workers and those with desirable traits leave, the quality of employees who remain employed is lower. In contrast, firing bad workers may improve outcomes by enhancing the average traits of employees that are retained (Jovanovic 1979; Weiss 1980) . Therefore, turnover rates that are too low may also indicate a problem and result in poor firm performance. This implies that turnover of employees can be positive or negative for outcomes depending on the economics of the particular firm and industry.
In the case of the nursing home industry, the primary caregivers and those most responsible for resident outcomes are licensed nurses and nurse aides, who are collectively referred to as nurses. These nurses come in three types based on the level of education, training, and licensure: (1) registered nurses (RNs), (2) licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and (3) certified nurse aides (CNAs). RNs and LPNs are considered licensed nurses because they have some postsecondary education and are required to pass licensing exams. Licensed nurses coordinate care, administer medicines and treatment ordered by physicians, and ensure professional oversight of care directly provided to residents. In contrast to licensed nurses, CNAs provide the majority of direct care to residents. Federal standards ( §483.152) only require CNAs to have at least 75 hours of training, which includes classroom instruction and clinical training (CMS 2016) .
The economics of employment in nursing homes lead the industry to experience high turnover, over 50 percent annually, and in some facilities more than 100 percent (Banaszak-Holl and Hines 1996) . Broken down by type of nurse, average annualized turnover rates for RNs, LPNs, and CNAs are estimated to be as high as 56, 51, and 75 percent, respectively (Donoghue 2009 ). One of the key drivers of turnover is that wages at nursing homes tend to be lower than in other health-care settings, and often the job is not considered as "glamorous" as those in other health-care industries, such as hospitals. For example, the mean hourly wage for an RN in a nursing home in 2013 was $29.81 compared with $33.94 for similar work in a hospital. In fact, RN wages in nursing homes were the lowest among the five settings where the BLS measured RN wages. 4 This drives licensed nurses to look for employment in other health-care settings. For CNAs, who are often considered unskilled or low-skilled workers, the average wage at nursing homes ($12.01 on average in 2013) is comparable to employment in similar skill-level jobs in retail, tourism, or other growing industries (Grabowski et al. 2011) . These other jobs may not have the same mental cost of caring for individuals who are physically dependent or have severe cognitive impairment. Also, CNAs are more likely to be single mothers (28 percent vs. 14 percent of all female workers), live in lower-income households, and remain low-income workers throughout their careers (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005; Baughman and Smith 2012; Smith and Baughman 2007) .
We expect nurse turnover to be procyclical, as poor economic environments make it harder for existing employees to find jobs in other industries. This implies that economic conditions may indirectly impact nursing home quality and mortality outcomes through turnover for a number of reasons. First, when the economy is strong it may be harder for nursing homes to fill job vacancies. This implies that for each nurse hired, the nursing home may need to look deeper into their applicant pool and may be required to hire individuals that have less desirable traits (e.g., less reliable, less caring, less experienced). Second, even if workers are replaced with an equally talented and motivated new employee, new employees can create disruption to providing effective and efficient care, as it takes time to become familiar with colleagues and nursing home policies. Third, nurse staffing levels are known to be associated with higher nursing home quality (Cohen and Spector 1995; Lin 2014) , and lower turnover can lead to more consistent staffing levels. Fourth, when turnover rates are low, each nurse has more experience in knowing how to provide high-quality care, meet regulatory standards, and build stronger personal relationships with residents (Thomas et al. 2013) . Such familiarity might decrease the likelihood of using more invasive care practices, such as catheters or physical restraints.
Overall, these mechanisms suggest that reducing turnover should result in improved health outcomes, and that higher unemployment rates would impact outcomes through reductions in nurse turnover. While a few studies have found that higher nurse turnover can lead to worse quality, the vast majority of studies do not find a statistically significant relationship (Castle and Anderson 2011; Castle and Engberg 2005; Castle, Engberg, and Men 2007; Lerner et al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2013 ). The lack of using causal identification may explain why most studies find statistically insignificant effects. Our contribution to the literature is to use causal identification techniques-specifically, to use the local unemployment rate as an instrument to determine how turnover impacts nursing home outcomes.
III. Data and Method

A. D ATA S O U R C E S A N D S A M P L E S E L E C T I O N
We use data from four sources. The first is utilization and financial information on longterm care facilities obtained from the California OSHPD. On an annual basis, OSHPD collects information on various measures such as patient census, patient demographics, major capital expenditures, wages and salaries, case-mix, and, most importantly for this study, labor turnover. We merge OSHPD data with data from the OSCAR data set. OSCAR, maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), is a uniform database of yearly regulatory reviews of all nursing homes that receive payments from Medicare or Medicaid. These reviews are completed by a government survey team that assesses nursing home quality and validates all the data reported in OSCAR. Reviews of nursing homes are completed every 9-15 months, with an average of 12 months between reviews. OSCAR contains data on the number of regulatory deficiencies each nursing home receives, staffing levels, case-mix, and multiple measures of quality. Finally, these two data sources are supplemented with information about the annual county unemployment level and demographic information from the BLS and Area Health Resource File, respectively.
The sample used in this analysis is freestanding nursing homes in the state of California from 2005 through 2011. The resulting sample consists of 6,806 facility-year observations of 1,076 unique nursing homes. 5 We examined the state of California because OSHPD data contain multiple measures of nursing and employee turnover, the key variable in this analysis. We selected the study period 2005-11 for three reasons. First, the study period includes economic growth and contraction associated with the Great Recession. This provides temporal and regional variation in the economic growth that aids in the identification of the effect of turnover in nursing homes. Second, California implemented a minimum nurse staffing ratio for hospitals that became effective in January 2004. Many hospitals were required to increase nurse staffing levels (Cook et al. 2012) , potentially impacting turnover in nursing homes. By starting the study in 2005, any impact of this change would have worked its way through the system. 5 While the vast majority of nursing homes have data for all years, some nursing homes may only have partial data because they entered or exited the market. To determine whether entry or exit is a concern, we estimated models for nursing homes that appear in the sample each year. Our results are not overly sensitive to entry or exit and are discussed in the "Robustness Tests" section. 6 We also examined slightly later starting years and found little difference in our results. 7 We also conducted a robustness check that accounts for this change in reimbursement. Results are qualitatively identical to our main results and are discussed in the "Robustness Tests" section with other robustness checks. F I G U R E 1 . Turnover and employment trends
The OSHPD provides data on the key explanatory variable of interest, staff turnover, which is available for three types of employees: (1) all employees; (2) all nursing staff (RNs, LPNs, and CNAs); and (3) CNAs. While most turnover in nursing homes is among CNAs, our main focus is on turnover rates for all nurses because the three available turnover rates are highly correlated, as shown in Figure 1 . 8 Turnover rates are measured annually and reflect the total number of unique employees paid anytime in the year relative to the number of employees paid in the average payroll period during the year. 9 All turnover rates are measured as percentages, with 0 percent indicating no turnover during the year and 100 percent indicating the average employee was replaced once during the year. The average annual turnover rate regardless of the measure used is approximately 50 percent, though some facilities report zero turnover in some years and others have turnover rates of over 200 percent (see Table 1 ). 8 The correlation between the three measures of turnover ranges from 0.80 to 0.89. In the "Robustness Tests" section, we present results for the other turnover measures. For easy visualization, Figure 1 plots the employment rate the opposite of the unemployment rate (i.e., 100 − unemployment). 9 The turnover rate is calculated as Turnover = [(total employment / average payroll employment) × 100% − 100%], where total employment is total number of unique employees paid anytime in the year, and average payroll employment is the average number of employees paid in each payroll period during the year. As an example, if total employment was 20 individuals and average payroll employment was 10, then the turnover rate would be 100% = [(20/10) × 100% − 100%]. The dependent variables are a series of quality measures and two mortality measures. Information on quality is obtained from OSCAR, which is considered one of the most reliable sources of data on quality of care in nursing homes and has been used in studies on the nursing home industry in California (Harrington et al. 2000; Matsudaira 2014 ). The first measure utilized is the number of regulatory deficiencies a facility received during their federally mandated regulatory inspection. We also follow the research of Harrington et al. (2000) by classifying each deficiency into three mutually exclusive categories: quality of care, quality of life, and other deficiencies. 10 As per the State Operations Manual, surveyors examine whether the facility is meeting each of over 180 federal regulatory standards.
TA B L E 1 .
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If the facility is found to fail to meet a standard, the inspection team will issue a deficiency indicating that a quality problem exists. For example, under regulation §483.13, residents have the right to be free from physical restraints unless medically necessary (CMS 2016) . If a nursing home uses physical restraints for discipline or convenience, then the nursing home would receive a deficiency for improper physical restraint use. For our study period, the average nursing home received 11.1 deficiencies, though the range is 0-51 (see Table 1 ).
The second and third sets of quality measures are resident outcomes and care practices utilized by the nursing home. The two resident outcome measures we examine are the percentage of residents with bedsores and the percentage of residents with 10 Quality of care included 72 specific items in the following federal survey categories: resident assessment, quality of care, nursing services, dietary services, physician services, rehabilitative services, dental services, pharmacy services, and infection control. The quality of life category included 77 specific items on resident's rights; admission, transfer, and discharge rights (including resident rights); resident behavior and facility practices (includes resident rights); quality of life; and physical environment. Other deficiencies included 30 specific items on administration, lab services, and other activities. 11 The State Operations Manual is available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance /Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf (accessed February 2, 2016).
contractures. Bedsores are an injury to the skin and tissue caused by lack of blood supply induced by constant pressure. A contracture is a shortening of the soft tissue caused by lack of movement of a joint. These two measures are good measures of quality of care because both conditions are preventable and treatable (Bowblis, Meng, and Hyer 2013; Grabowski 2001) . Two measures of care practices are also utilized: the percentage of residents with catheters and percentage physically restrained. Care practices are associated with quality of life and may impact the physical and emotional health of residents (Bowblis and Lucas 2012) . For instance, the insertion of catheters places the resident at greater risk for urinary tract infection (Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006; Park and Stearns 2009) . Physical restraints, on the other hand, may increase the risk of bedsores, depression, mental and physical deterioration, and mortality (Park and Stearns 2009; Zinn 1993) .
For both resident outcomes and care practice quality measures, higher values imply lower quality. Additionally, some residents may have had the underlying condition or been ordered to have a care practice prior to admission. In order to account for preadmission case-mix, the percentage of residents with each condition is adjusted for residents that had the condition prior to admission. The measures utilized therefore reflect the percentage of residents that acquired the condition at the facility. Even after adjusting for acquiring the condition at the facility, the variation in quality in these measures is significant (Table 1) . For example, the average observation has 2.5 percent of residents with a facility-acquired bedsore, though the range is 0-78 percent. Similar patterns are found for contractures, catheters, and physical restraints.
The final dependent variables we examine are measures of mortality. The OSHPD data report the annual number of discharges that are due to death. We calculate the proportion of discharges that are due to death by dividing discharges due to death by total discharges. For simplicity we refer to this measure as the discharge death rate. As an alternative measure, we also calculate the proportion of residents who die as a percentage of year-end census, which we refer to as the census death rate. The census death rate is an estimate and measured with some noise because we do not have the exact number of residents that were in the nursing home throughout the year, but it proxies for death rate. 12 We follow the literature by using log death rate measures (Stevens et al. 2015) .
C. E M P I R I C A L S T R AT E G Y
To identify the impact of turnover on mortality and quality of nursing home care, we specify the following linear panel regression model:
where Q jct is a measure of quality or mortality for nursing home j in county c, in year t, and T jct is a measure of turnover. The parameter θ captures the effect of turnover on quality. The vector X jct accounts for patient, facility, and market characteristics that may influence nursing home quality. To account for variation in quality over time, a time trend is also included (τ t ) and is specified to be a quadratic. Finally, to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, δ j is treated as a nursing home fixed effect. An issue with estimating equation 1 is that turnover is likely to be correlated with unobserved time-varying factors, and/or nursing home quality and turnover are simultaneously determined. Both of these lead to the endogeneity of turnover, and this requires equation 1 to be estimated using IV. IV methods require the existence of an exclusion restriction, commonly referred to as an instrument that explains the endogenous variable but is orthogonal to the dependent variable of interest. In this context, an exclusion restriction is a variable that explains turnover but does not explain quality or mortality independent of turnover. The exclusion restriction used is the annual county unemployment rate. County unemployment varies geographically across California and temporally with growth in the economy leading up to the Great Recession and the negative shock to the economy caused by the housing market crash. When IV is utilized, the following firststage model is estimated in order to obtain predicted values of turnover for each nursing home:
where U ct is the annual county unemployment rate and all other variables have the same interpretation as equation 1. Most prior studies on nursing home turnover and quality are cross-sectional in nature or use only FE. In order to compare the bias that may arise from only using ordinary least squares (OLS) or ignoring the endogeneity of turnover caused by time-invariant or timevarying unobserved variables, we report results estimating the above equations using three different statistical techniques: pooled OLS, panel FE, and panel FE with IV. By comparing pooled OLS to panel FE specification, we are able to determine how failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time can bias pooled OLS. However, if unobservable time-varying factors also drive endogeneity, both pooled OLS and panel FE would report biased estimates. Therefore, we also compare pooled OLS and panel FE to our preferred estimation technique, panel FE with IV.
When comparing the results from the three estimation techniques, the direction of the bias depends on the relationship between the omitted variable, the endogenous explanatory variable, and the dependent variable. In this application, poor layout of the physical structure of a nursing home, a time-invariant factor, can lead to worse quality but can also be correlated with turnover rates. If endogeneity occurred only because of omitting time-invariant factors similar to nursing home layout, then we would expect pooled OLS to overestimate the effect of turnover compared with panel FE model. In the case of timevarying unobservables, the direction of the bias could be due to unobserved changes in resident characteristics over time. For example, a nursing home with higher staffing and lower turnover may on average admit residents that are sicker, and this difference in casemix across facilities may not be adequately accounted for in our model. In this scenario, unobserved resident case-mix and poor quality would be positively correlated, leading to a downward bias for both pooled OLS and panel FE models. On the other hand, if facilities with more severe unobserved case-mix have higher workloads leading to higher turnover, then OLS would be biased upward.
We also report results using various levels of controls. In one set of specifications, we control for no additional covariates (X jct or τ t ). In the second set of specifications, additional controls are included but time trends are omitted. The purpose of reporting these two model specifications is to show that including additional controls does not significantly impact the effect of turnover on quality. 13 The third specification includes all controls and includes a quadratic time trend. The time trends are highly correlated with the exclusion restriction and eliminate much of the yearly variation in the exclusion restriction, making equation 1 sensitive to how time trends is defined. Specifically, the effect size for the turnover variable in equation 1 is consistent but the statistical significance is sometimes sensitive to the definition. Therefore, the main regression results include a common quadratic time trend, though alternative definitions are discussed further in the "Robustness Tests" section.
14 While nine sets of regression results are reported for each quality measure, the preferred specification is panel FE with IV that includes controls and time trends.
D. E X C LU S I O N R E S T R I C T I O N VA R I A B L E
The exclusion restriction utilized in this study is the county unemployment rate. 15 The vast majority of nursing home workers are CNAs or other workers of similar skill levels, such as housekeeping and food service staff. The labor market for these types of workers is characterized by great fluidity and wages close to the minimum wage (Munroe 1990 ). This implies that most nursing home workers earn wages that are about the same as similarly skilled workers in retail, hotels, or fast food chains. 16 The intuition underlying the strength of the instrument is that weak labor markets would reduce nursing home turnover, as there are fewer non-health-care employment opportunities for most nursing home workers. In terms of orthogonality, the unemployment rate is required to be uncorrelated with any unobserved time-varying factor that may influence nursing home quality. While the 13 Some control variables may be endogenous; therefore, by showing that the results are not sensitive to including or excluding control variables, we show that any potential endogeneity of these other variables does not impact the results on turnover. 14 An alternative model specification that was utilized that does not require a time trend is a longdifferenced model. This included taking the first difference of the data for years 2005 and 2011, and then estimating a cross-sectional regression. The coefficient estimates for the long-differenced model were consistent with those reported in the paper. 15 We also use a number of alternative model specifications to test the sensitivity of the exclusion restriction. These alternatives included various lags of county unemployment rates and turnover as exclusion restrictions. In these alternative specifications, exclusion restrictions often failed weak instrument tests, but the second-stage results for turnover were found to have the same direction and general magnitudes as those reported. 16 Citing a 1996 Institute of Medicine report, Grabowski et al. (2011, 282) note that the wage rates between CNAs are comparable to levels offered at retail and fast food establishments: there were "reports of NAs leaving health care for retail jobs when a Kmart opened or to waitress or clean in locations where the tourist industry was growing. " exclusion restriction is likely to be valid because the nursing home industry is only a small sector of any county's overall economy, there are some validity concerns.
First, poor macroeconomic conditions may change the demand for nursing home care. For instance, unemployed workers may be able to provide informal care to their aging parents or relatives. However, periods of high unemployment may also reduce the availability of informal care as caregivers may be more likely to take on multiple part-time jobs to make ends meet. This means bad economic conditions could either hasten or delay entry into nursing homes for individuals who may marginally consider entering a nursing home. While we do not expect county unemployment rates to directly lead to unobservable changes in residents admitted to nursing homes, there is a possibility that the availability of informal care over the course of the business cycle may impact nursing home admission rates and perhaps quality outcomes on the margin.
To rule out this possible channel we analyze the effect of county unemployment rate on total admissions, total discharges, and observable patient characteristics-that is, physical acuity level of patients, percentage of residents with dementia, psychiatric illness, and developmental disability. We estimate two models: the first is a simple correlation (OLS with no controls) and the second is the correlation after controlling for nursing home FE and time trends. Our preferred specification is the second model, since we use panel data in our analysis. The results of this exercise are reported in Online Appendix Table 1 (see http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/ajhe_a_00096).
In both models, we find that county unemployment rate has no direct effect on admissions, discharges, and percentage of residents with dementia or developmental disability. Psychiatric illness is correlated with unemployment rates, but the effect disappears when nursing home FE and time trends are included. We also find that county unemployment is negatively correlated with physical acuity, but once FE and time trends are included the correlation is positive and statistically significant. 17 We conclude from our exercise that county unemployment rate has no direct effect on the volume or case-mix of nursing home residents. This result is not surprising since most residents in nursing homes are the oldest of the elderly population, and the decision to enter a nursing home is usually determined by physical and/or cognitive functioning, which is independent of county unemployment rate. While the business cycle may be correlated with the financial standing of some nursing home residents, making private-pay residents spend down to Medicaid faster, these time-varying factors are observable and controlled for in the regression analysis.
Another potential validity concern is that the quality of existing nursing home workers and applicant pool from which nursing homes hire new employees changes with the business cycle. During periods of high unemployment, fewer workers leave employment, which has a direct effect on the average tenure of existing workers. Though this will affect worker quality through longer tenure, we argue that this mechanism is a direct effect of turnover and does not threaten the validity of the exclusion restriction. Of greater concern is the possibility that the unobserved ability of job applicants may be higher during a recession. While this is a possibility, nursing home trade associations have argued that there is a shortage of trained and qualified workers to meet the long-term care needs in the United States, regardless of the business cycle. For example, a recent report on the long-term care workforce by a trade association argues that the professional long-term care workforce is not trained to handle the needs of elderly consumers. 18 The report notes that higher education for RNs and LPNs does not cover long-term care nursing fully in their curriculum and that nurses are not adequately trained in nursing schools for the administrative duties of working in a nursing home. Furthermore, the report highlights how CNAs often have no long-term care experience prior to hiring and that CNAs are only required to have minimal training. This suggests that the quality of workers available to nursing homes is largely driven by on-the-job training and not the quality of applicants. An implication of this is that industry and firm-specific human capital is more important for delivering good quality care in nursing homes than general human capital.
Similar to the quality of workers, the effort level of existing workers is a mechanism that may impact the validity of the exclusion restriction. For example, higher unemployment rates increase the cost of a job loss, and therefore, workers may exert more effort to avoid getting fired (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) . While there is theoretical evidence for this effect, the threat of firing is relatively low at nursing homes because of difficulty with recruiting. For example, employment of CNAs is very fluid, with the mean (median) duration of employment spells for the same employer at 9.7 (5.0) months (Baughman and Smith 2012) . Additionally, the total turnover rate and the proportion of turnover that is voluntary is higher in nursing homes than other industries.
19 Thus, because voluntary rather than involuntary turnover dominates labor mobility at nursing homes, we suspect that the likelihood of increasing effort to avoid firing during economic downturns is lower at nursing homes compared with other industries.
Furthermore, there are no studies in the nursing home industry that empirically validate the worker effort claim of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) by directly linking macroeconomic conditions and worker effort. The closest example is a study by Morgan, Dill, and Kalleberg (2013) , who examine job satisfaction and intent to stay among frontline health-care workers, which included CNAs in nursing homes. They find that job satisfaction and intent to stay was not statistically associated with unemployment rates. In a study of blue-collar workers, which did not focus on the health-care sector, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) asked respondents to rank the most important factors that kept them from shirking. Only 10.1 percent of blue-collar workers identified "high unemployment" as the 18 See http://www.leadingage.org/sites/default/files/LTC_Workforce_Commission_Report.pdf (accessed February 3, 2017) . 19 Turnover in our sample averages around 50 percent compared with 15.7 percent for all US industries in 2014. Furthermore, Donoghue and Castle (2006) report that the ratio of voluntary to involuntary turnover at nursing homes is 5.2 to 1 (83.8 percent for RNs, 3.25 to 1 (76.4 percent) for LPNs, and 2.7 to 1 (72.9 percent) for CNAs. This compares with the national voluntary turnover rate of about 70 percent for all US industries; see http://www.compensationforce.com/2015/03/2014-turnover-rates-by-industry.html (accessed May 5, 2015) . most important factor. High wages (25.7 percent), good management-worker relationships (46.8 percent), and good working conditions (14.7 percent) were more important determinants of shirking. The results of these studies suggest that effort levels may be related to how workers feel about management and their value to an employer, and less about the underlying macroeconomic conditions. In summary, a valid exclusion restriction must explain the turnover rate of workers in nursing homes but be orthogonal to quality except through its effect on turnover. There is strong economic evidence that unemployment rates explain turnover, yet there are some concerns that the unemployment rate can be correlated with quality due to changes in who is admitted to nursing homes because of the availability of informal care from unemployed family members, changes in the quality of applicant pool in which nursing homes may hire, and changes in worker effort. While these concerns have some face validity, our analysis of changes in admission patterns and the employment challenges that face nursing homes suggests that these concerns may be limited in this industry.
E. O T H E R C O N T R O L VA R I A B L E S
Included in some model specifications and captured in the vector X jct are resident, facility, and market control variables that may influence quality. These can broadly be divided into resident demographics, facility structure, operational characteristics, resident case-mix, staffing levels, and market characteristics. Summary statistics for all of these variables are reported in Table 1 .
Residential demographics capture the percentage of residents that report a nonwhite or unknown race and the percentage of residents that report Hispanic ethnicity. Facility structure is captured by ownership, facility size, membership in a multifacility organization, and the presence of special care units. Ownership of a facility can be by a for-profit, not-for-profit, or government organization. Each of these ownership types has different objectives and may result in different levels of investment in quality (Grabowski et al. 2013) . Larger facilities may have economies of scale in quality, while facilities that are part of large chains may institute standardized care processes and have greater resources that could be shared across facilities. Additional resources and specialized, trained staff are often associated with special care units.
Operational characteristics dictate the amount of financial resources a facility has available to devote to improving quality. For example, Medicaid reimbursement rates are generally low, and nursing homes that have greater reliance on Medicaid residents tend to have lower quality (Gertler 1992) . To capture how payer-mix can influence quality, we include the percentage of resident days paid for by Medicare, Medicaid, managed care, and self-pay with a reference group of private pay as defined by OSHPD. 20 These resources only materialize if a bed is occupied; therefore, occupancy rates are included as a control.
While operational characteristics indicate resources available, resident case-mix dictates the amount of resources a facility needs. Most facilities provide post-acute care and long-term care, which require different resources. To capture the relative importance of post-acute care in each facility, we include the percentage of discharges that occurred in less than one month. Additionally, more complex case-mix, as measured by higher physical acuity levels, and more residents with dementia, psychiatric illnesses, or developmental disability, impacts the level of quality a nursing home can achieve.
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Nurse staffing is the primary input in the production of nursing home services, and higher levels of staffing are thought to improve quality (Bowblis 2011; Lin 2014; Park and Stearns 2009) . Nurse staffing consists of three types: RNs, LPNs, and CNAs. For each type of nurse, we construct measures of staffing level in terms of hours per resident day (HPRD). We also construct a measure of total nurse staff HPRD, which is the sum of HPRD for all three nurse types. Because of measurement error from self-reporting, following Bowblis (2011) we identify observations that have zero staffing or are three standard deviations above the mean. For these identified observations, reported staffing levels are changed to zero, and we include in the regression an indicator variable for potentially erroneous staffing levels being reported.
The final set of controls includes market-level characteristics that may influence turnover or nursing home quality. Following the nursing home literature, the county is used as a proxy for the geographic market (Cawley, Grabowski, and Hirth 2006) . Market-level variables used in this study include market concentration as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that treats each facility as a separate entity and uses number of beds to measure market share, the log of population over the age of 65, and the log of per capita income.
IV. Results
A. F I R S T -S TA G E R E S U LT S
An exclusion restriction that is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable can do more harm than good by increasing the bias relative to treating the endogenous variable as exogenous (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995) . Visual evidence from Figure 1 shows that all three turnover measures are highly correlated with the employment rate (100 − unemployment rate), with correlations of at least 0.93. While this suggests a strong correlation between unemployment and turnover, statistical tests can determine whether an exclusion restriction is too weakly correlated to be considered valid. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest estimating the first-stage regression (equation 2) and performing an F-test on the 21 The average physical acuity level of the facility is measured by the acuindex (Cowles 2002) , which captures the level of need based on activities of daily living and special treatments received by residents. Higher values imply greater acuity levels. 22 For antitrust and merger analysis purposes, nursing home geographic markets may be better defined using alternative metrics. In this study, market-level characteristics are utilized as control variables, and using alternative definitions does not significantly influence the impact of turnover on quality. exclusion restrictions to determine whether they are jointly equal to zero. Their rough guideline is that an F-statistic below 10 would imply that the correlation is too weak for the exclusion to be considered valid. A second method is to estimate a Cragg-Donaldson statistic on the exclusion restrictions in the first stage and compare the test with the critical values obtained by Stock and Yogo (2005) . An exclusion restriction is weak if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Table 2 reports the first-stage results (equation 2) using various levels of control variables: column 1 only includes facility FE, column 2 adds other control variables, and column 3 is the full regression specification that includes other control variables, FE, and time trends. All three specifications find that higher unemployment rates reduce nursing home turnover, with effect sizes ranging from a 1.2 to 2.4 percentage point reduction in turnover for each 1 percentage point increase in the county unemployment rate. The effects are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and all specifications pass the Staiger-Stock criteria for a weak exclusion restriction by having an F-statistic over 10. Additionally, all our main specifications pass the Stock-Yogo criteria by having a Cragg-Donaldson statistic above the critical value of 16.38, assuming a 10 percent maximal IV size. Table 3 reports the regression results for equation 1 for total deficiencies and number of deficiencies by the three domains of quality of care, quality of life, and other deficiencies. The model specifications include the use of pooled OLS, panel FEs, and panel FEs with IV. The first three columns report models that do not include any additional control variables or time trends, whereas columns 4-6 include additional controls but not time trends.
TA B L E 2 . Select first-stage IV results
B. T H E E F F E C T O F N U R S I N G T U R N O V E R
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The final three columns, 7-9, are the full model specifications. For all coefficient estimates reported, the interpretation is how the quality measure changes in response to a 1 percentage point change in the nurse turnover rate.
TA B L E 3 .
Main results: Effect of nursing turnover on deficiencies Notes: Regression estimates are reported in the table with standard errors adjusted for clustering by facility in parentheses. Facility and county characteristics include ownership status, facility size, chain membership, payer-mix, occupancy rates, proportion of minority and Hispanic patients, discharges less than one month, staffing, log of county-level per capita income, log of population over 65, HHI, and case-mix variables reported in The effect of turnover tends to follow a similar pattern across all model specifications and for all four measures of deficiencies. Generally, the inclusion of FEs reduces the effect size of turnover relative to using pooled OLS. We also find that OLS and FE models underestimate the impact of turnover on quality when compared with panel FE with IV (columns 3, 6, and 9). This is similar to the finding of Lin (2014) , who uses state mandated changes in nurse staffing ratios as an exclusion restriction for nurse staffing level, and finds that OLS underestimates the effect of staffing level on quality of care at nursing homes. The downward bias could be due to the fact that nursing homes with more severe case-mix may have higher staffing and low turnover. If case-mix is not adequately controlled for at the facility level, then OLS will underestimate the impact of high staffing and low turnover on quality of care. Furthermore, Table 3 also shows the importance of controlling for other covariates, as the inclusion of additional control variables and time trends tends to increase the size of coefficient estimates.
In panel a of Table 3 , the results of the nine model specifications are reported using the number of deficiencies as the dependent variable. Across all specifications the coefficient estimate for turnover is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the panel FE with IV regression specification (columns 3, 6, and 9), a 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in a facility receiving 0.5-1.8 more deficiencies, reflecting a 4.4-16.5 percent increase in the number of deficiencies relative to the sample average. For the three domains (panels b-d), all specifications have effects in the same direction as the results for total number of deficiencies, indicating that all aspects of nursing home quality deteriorate with higher turnover.
24 While all domains of deficiencies show decreases in quality with turnover, relative to the sample average, the magnitudes for the quality of life and other deficiencies are significantly larger than for quality of care. For example, a 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in 0.75 more deficiencies in quality of care, 0.67 more deficiencies in quality of life, and 0.35 more other deficiencies (column 9), but adjusting for the sample average, the effects translate into increases of 11.2 percent, 20.4 percent, and 42.6 percent, respectively. 25 Table 4 reports the results for resident outcomes (panels a-b) and care practice quality measures (panels c-d), as well as mortality outcomes (panels e-f). Similar to Table  3 , the effect of turnover tends to follow a similar pattern across all model specifications. One exception is that when time trends are included, the effect sizes are similar but become statistically insignificant. This is likely due to the time trend being highly correlated with the exclusion restriction and IV being less efficient than pooled OLS or panel FE regression.
Panels a and b report the results for the resident outcomes measures of facilityacquired bedsores and contractures, respectively. For bedsores, all specifications indicate 24 Regression results for bedsores with all covariates are reported in Online Appendix Table 3 . 25 These results are consistent with lower turnover spilling over to all aspects of quality in a nursing home. For example, lower turnover allows nurses to create bonds with residents, potentially improving their quality of life more than quality of care. It is also worth noting that most of the deficiencies classified as "other" are related to administrative tasks. With lower turnover the experience of the average nurse increases, improving his or her knowledge of what administrative tasks need to be performed.
TA B L E 4 .
Main results: Effect of nursing turnover on quality of care and mortality Notes: Same as in Table 3 . that higher turnover decreases quality. For the entire panel FE with IV regressions, a 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in a 0.17-0.54 percentage point increase in the proportion of residents with bedsores. This effect size is quite large, reflecting a 6.9-22.0 percent increase relative to the sample average. This result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast, none of the results are statistically significant for contractures, and two model specifications have negative coefficient estimates.
Panels c and d report the results for the care practice quality measures. For facilityacquired catheters and physical restraints, all but one of the model specifications show a positive relationship between turnover and care practice, and the majority of coefficient estimates are statistically significant. This indicates that higher turnover leads to use of care practices associated with poor quality. It should be noted that for both care practice measures, the panel FE with IV models with full controls are statistically significant without time trends, but are not statistically significant when time trends are included. Again, this is likely due to the high correlation of the time trend with the exclusion restriction and inefficiency associated with IV.
The final two panels (e and f) report the mortality results. For both mortality measures and across all specifications, the effect of turnover is positive, which is consistent with higher turnover resulting in greater mortality among nursing home residents. For all panel FE with IV models, the effect of turnover is statistically significant for the discharge death rate (proportion of discharges due to death), though in our preferred specification (column 9) the result is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In terms of effect size, a 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in an 8.3-17.4 percent increase in the discharge death rate in the panel FE with IV specifications. In the case of the census death rate (number of deaths divided by year-end census), we find that all results are statistically significant except in the last two columns, which include our preferred specification (column 9). For effect sizes, the census death rate increases 3.0-8.3 percent for every 10 percentage point increase in turnover in the panel FE with IV models.
To put these results in the context of Stevens et al. (2015) , who find that a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment reduces the state-level mortality rate among nursing home residents by 4.7 percent, a similar 1 percentage point increase in unemployment in our data decreases turnover by 1.1-2.4 percentage points, depending on the specification (as per Table 2 ). If we extrapolate these changes in turnover to calculate the effect of turnover on mortality using the results from the panel FE with IV models (Table 4) , we calculate a 0.9-3.9 percent reduction in the discharge death rate and a 0.3-1.9 percent reduction in the census death rate.
C. R O B U S T N E S S T E S T S
To ensure that the results are robust to the empirical strategy employed, a series of robustness tests are performed. The results of these robustness tests are reported in Tables 5  and 6 . In both tables, column 1 reports the coefficient estimates for our main result (i.e., column 9 of Table 3 or 4).
As noted in the results section, the statistical significance of some measures of quality is sensitive to the definition of the time trend. Additionally, quality may be dynamic
TA B L E 5 .
Robustness checks 
Continued
(1) in nature, and any persistence in quality may impact the results. To test the sensitivity to the definition of the time trend, models were estimated that used a common linear trend (Table 5 , column 2), a county-specific linear trend, and a county-specific quadratic trend (column 3). To examine whether the dynamic nature of nursing home quality created persistence in our outcomes that may be correlated with turnover, we estimated models with a lagged measure of quality or mortality (column 4). These alternative definitions of the time trends and lagged measures of quality or mortality resulted in effect sizes for turnover consistent with those reported in column 1.
In our main specification, we use all nursing homes regardless of the number of times they are observed in the data, but our results may be sensitive to missing data. First, OSCAR surveys are performed every 9-15 months, and some nursing homes may be missing data for a year because there is no OSCAR data available. Second, firms may not have data for all years because the firm entered or exited the market during the study period. If nursing homes that enter or exit the market are systematically different from those that are observed in all years, this could potentially bias the results. Column 5 of Table 5 reports results based on a balanced panel-that is, using only nursing homes that have data for all years. We find that the general conclusions we can draw are similar to the baseline model, though some of the results become insignificant. This is likely due to the sample size being over 41 percent smaller than the baseline specification.
Another set of concerns is related to changes California made to Medicaid reimbursement in 2005 and the potential for outliers to affect the turnover variable. California implemented facility-specific Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing home care in 2005. Higher reimbursement rates may have had an effect on quality if facilities increased wages of workers in response to the reimbursement change. To account for the change in reimbursement rates, column 6 of Table 5 includes the facility-specific reimbursement rate as a control variable for observations with reimbursement data.
26 Also, some of the nursing homes report turnover rates that are abnormally high or low. To test the sensitivity of the results to potential coding errors in turnover, we exclude outliers by restricting the analysis to only observations between the 1st and 99th percentile of turnover. These results are reported in column 7. Overall, both sets of robustness checks find results statistically similar to the baseline models.
Next, we examine our measures of nurse staffing levels, as staffing may be simultaneously determined with turnover, making the effect of turnover sensitive to how nurse staffing levels are measured. Additionally, staffing levels are highly correlated with the turnover. Finally, some nursing homes report staffing levels that are clearly coding errors, and we flagged these nursing homes in our regressions with an indicator for coding error. To test the sensitivity of our results to how staffing levels are specified, we estimate a series of alternative specifications. In Table 6 , column 2, total nurse staffing HPRD is utilized TA B L E 6 . 
Robustness checks
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(1)
(8) 
(8) instead of staffing levels for each nurse type. In column 3, nurse staffing levels are excluded as a control variable, whereas in column 4 we estimate models that exclude observations with staffing levels that are coding errors. All of these specifications report results similar to the baseline model. Though the results are not sensitive to staffing levels, there is a concern that patients may select into nursing homes based on their ability to pay. For example, a nursing home resident that is paying for care out of their own savings may prefer and be able to afford a nursing home with more staffing and higher quality. If this selection is great enough, this could lead to payer-mix and staffing levels measured at the facility level to be jointly determined with turnover and quality. To address this concern, columns 5-7 estimate models where staffing levels and payer-mix are measured at the county level instead of the individual facility. Modeling payer-mix and staffing levels this way finds effects consistent with the main specification.
The main results reported in the paper use turnover for all nurses. The results may be sensitive to the measure of turnover utilized. Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 use the other measures of turnover: CNA turnover and total employee turnover. These alternative specifications are in line with the baseline models, which is not surprising since all the turnover variables are highly correlated with each other.
Finally, we run a number of falsification tests to make sure the causal pathways between turnover and quality are not an artifact of the model specification. To do this, we identify a number of quality measures that should not be related to nurse turnover rates. These quality measures should be driven by non-nurse personnel, such as physicians, directors of nursing, administrative staff, or maintenance. These quality measures include the proportion of residents who used antibiotics and obtained flu shots and pneumonia vaccines, as well as whether the facility received a specific deficiency, such as deficiencies for notifying residents of rights and regulations at admission, informing guardians of significant changes, having certain written policies, having comfortable sound levels, and ensuring that rooms have proper square footage, among others. In 9 of the 10 examined, we find that turnover was not statistically related to these quality measures.
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V. Conclusion
Nurse turnover has been cited as an important source of nursing home quality problems. Several studies have asserted that nurse turnover in nursing homes is associated with low-quality care (Bostick et al. 2006; Castle and Engberg 2005; Collier and Harrington 2008) , although most studies find no statistically significant relationship and fail to account for the fact that nurse turnover is endogenous. In this paper, we use IV estimation to address the endogeneity of nurse turnover on mortality and quality of care. Specifically, we leverage the deterioration in labor market conditions during the Great Recession when nursing turnover at nursing homes in California declined by 17 percentage points. This decline was highly correlated with the decrease in employment rate during the same period.
Not accounting for endogeneity severely underestimates the impact of nurse turnover on quality of care in nursing homes. Our main finding is that a 10 percentage point increase in nursing turnover leads to an additional 1.8 deficiency citations to a nursing home per annual survey. This represents a 16.5 percent increase in deficiency citations. Not accounting for endogeneity suggests that nurse turnover leads to a 1 percent increase in citations. We also find that higher turnover leads to worse quality of care in terms of bedsores and there is suggestive evidence that other measures of quality are also worse, although the statistical significance of the effect for other measures of quality is sensitive to the inclusion of time trends.
We find that mortality tends to improve as turnover is reduced. A 10 percentage point increase in turnover results in an 8.3-17.4 percent increase in the discharge death rate and increases the census death rate by 3.0-8.3 percent. While these results are statistically weak in our preferred specifications-in particular, the census death rate results-the findings are generally consistent with the procyclical nature of mortality suggested by Stevens et al. (2015) , who find that mortality among nursing home residents increased by 4.7 percent for each 1 percentage point increase in unemployment. We find results that are consistent with their finding. One reason for the divergence is that they use state-level age-adjusted mortality rates and focus on older adults (aged 85+). In this study, we use mortality rates and the proportion of discharges that are due to death which are specific to each nursing home in the state of California and cannot adjust these rates for resident age. Therefore, the construction of our mortality measures are different. Also, in our measures we are not able to accurately calculate the denominator for the census death rate, as we do not know the number of residents who were in a nursing home during the course of the year. While this is a limitation of our study, our results suggest that turnover is a potentially important mechanism that may explain the procyclical nature of mortality. Further research is needed in order to more accurately measure mortality in nursing homes, such as using the Minimum Data Set.
There have been efforts to reduce turnover, such as commitments by the American Health Care Association and Ohio's use of pay-for-performance based on keeping turnover below a certain threshold. While these initiatives were promoted using studies based on association and not causal effects, our finding that ignoring the endogeneity of turnover can severely underestimate the impact of high turnover on reducing quality suggests that maybe even greater emphasis on this nursing home quality issue is warranted. Efforts that improve pay relative to outside options, improve working conditions and employee satisfaction, and reward nursing homes that are able to retain good employees should be examined as possible public policy responses.
The fact that turnover is lower during the Great Recession and that nursing home quality improves with lower turnover indicates that nursing home quality is countercyclical. While maintaining nursing home quality has always been a concern, the Great Recession lowered turnover in nursing homes, improving overall quality. As employment increases, competition for workers should increase. Then outside options will become more available, thus increasing turnover in nursing homes.
